The Government of Memory: Public Inquiries and the Limits of Justice in Northern Ireland by Hegarty, Angela
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 26, Issue 4 2002 Article 10
The Government of Memory: Public Inquiries
and the Limits of Justice in Northern Ireland
Angela Hegarty∗
∗
Copyright c©2002 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
The Government of Memory: Public Inquiries
and the Limits of Justice in Northern Ireland
Angela Hegarty
Abstract
The purpose of this Article is to examine the exercise and the usefulness of the public inquiry
model, in the Northern Ireland conflict. This Article examines its role as both an accountability
mechanism and a truth process, and in doing so I consider the proposition that public inquiries are
employed by governments not as a tool to find truth and establish accountability for human rights
violations, but as a way of deflecting criticism and avoiding blame.
THE GOVERNMENT OF MEMORY: PUBLIC




That States commit violations of human rights is an undeni-
able, if much denied, truth. These violations are often not offi-
cially acknowledged until some time after they have been carried
out, and the complete account of such violations may not
emerge until the regime responsible has been removed from
power. The events and the acts complained of are often denied
by the State responsible until it is obliged, sometimes as a result
of a political settlement, to submit to an investigation. Much of
the dialogue about how to address such violations has therefore
been in the context of transitional justice or of societies emerg-
ing from conflict. As part of that conflict there are often com-
peting versions of the truth: that promoted by the State which
has inflicted the abuses and that preserved by those individuals
and communities who have suffered the abuses. In that struggle
between official and unofficial versions of the truth, law is often
appropriated by the State as a tool to deny the abuse. Those
who have suffered the abuses often learn from this and employ
law as a tool to focus attention on the violation.
The processes by which human rights violations are ad-
dressed involves a variety of official and unofficial mechanisms.
Some mechanisms are political, some community-based, some
are legal, and some combine all three aspects and a number of
legal models that have emerged. There are also a plethora of
legal prohibitions on human rights abuses, domestic and inter-
national, and a growing number of legal mechanisms that can be
used to address such violations.
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The purpose of this Article is to examine the exercise and
the usefulness of one such model, the public inquiry model, in
the Northern Ireland conflict. I examine its role as both an ac-
countability mechanism and a truth process, and in doing so I
consider the proposition that public inquiries are employed by
governments not as a tool to find truth and establish accounta-
bility for human rights violations, but as a way of deflecting criti-
cism and avoiding blame. Through an exploration of the key
issues raised thus far by the latest incarnation of the public in-
quiry model - the Bloody Sunday Inquiry - I consider whether
a domestic public inquiry, even one with some international as-
pects, is capable of finding truth and establishing accountability,
which, I argue, are necessary for the creation of permanent
peace in Northern Ireland. From this critique, I construct a ru-
bric by which any proposed mechanism may be judged, and of-
fer some suggestions for such a mechanism. The themes which
dominate this discussion - the meaning of truth and the impor-
tance of accountabilty, the use of law by the State to avoid blame
for human rights violations, and victims' expectations and exper-
iences of truth processes - draw upon the Northern Ireland
experience but are common across many jurisdictions and com-
munities emerging from conflict.
It has been cogently argued' that criminal trials are the best
legal method to address such violations, as they permit the re-
claiming of the values so wholly undermined by the abuses.
There are other ways, principally that of public investigation,2 by
which such violations can be pursued. The processes of "trial"
and "truth" as Hayner has argued,' are not mutually exclusive.
The inquiry mode is sometimes a substitute for, and sometimes a
precursor to, criminal charges. Both focus on the construction
of an official or agreed-upon version of the truth, as well as upon
legal accountability.
In Northern Ireland, criminal trials have overwhelmingly fo-
1. See generally CARLOS NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL (1996); see also MARK OSIEL,
MAss ArROCITY, COLLEcTIVE MEMORY AND THE LAw (1997); Payam Akhavan, Justice in
The -lague: Peace In The Former Yugoslavia? Commentary on the U.N. War Crimes Tribunal,
20 Hum. R-rs. Q. 737-816 (1998).
2. That is, a civil, rather than a criminal, inquiry into events conducted in public.
3. Pricilla Hayner, Truth Commissions 5 (Paper presented at the Conference on
Truth, Justice, Accountability and Reconciliation in Societies Emerging from Crimes
Against Humanity at the University of British Columbia, Oct. 13-14, 2000).
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cused on the actions of the non-State actors, or the "paramilita-
ries."' There have been very few prosecutions of State actors,
that is, police officers and members of the British Army,5 despite
the fact that they have been responsible for ten percent of the
deaths in the conflict.' Consequently, there have been numer-
ous calls in the past thirty years for an independent investigation
of the many controversial events involving the State and the
practices that gave rise to them.
At the heart of those demands has been the existence of
human rights abuses and the partial breakdown in the rule of
law. Calls for independent inquiries have multiplied as the fail-
Lire of the existing legal processes to hold the State accountable
for its role in the conflict has become apparent. Yet, the re-
sponse of the State to such events and to the requirement for
independent investigation has been problematic. This has com-
pounded the pervasive sense of impunity. Coupled with this has
been a growing local awareness of the "truth commission"
model, largely through publicity of the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. This has led to calls for a local
truth commission, encompassing the activities of State and non-
State actors.
I. PUBLIC INVESTIGATION
There are two models of public investigation that have been
4. Between 1970 and 1980 alone, more than 8,270 people were convicted of indict-
able "scheduled" (i.e., terrorist-type) offenses. Hansard, Commons Written Answers,
Mar. 6, 1998, at Col. 30032.
5. There have been twenty-fotir prosecutions and eight convictions of police of-
ficers and soldiers for the use of force while on duty. FIONNUAIA Nt AOLAIN, THE PoLT-l
ICS OF FORCE: CONFLIC'T MANAGEMENT AN) STATE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND 73
(2000) [hereinafter POLITICS OF FORCE].
6. This figure is a minimuam, which would rise substantially if the allegations of
collusion between the State and Loyalist paramilitaries are correct. See BRITISH IRISH
RitGHS IAvi-i, DEADLY INTE.LIGENCE: STATE COLLUSION WITH- LOYALIST VIOLENCE IN
NORTHERN IRELAND (1999). The allegations of collIsion are so serious that in May
2002, the United Kingdom ("UK") and Irish governments appointed the retired Cana-
dian judge, Peter Corry, to carry out an investigation into seven key cases, including
those of Pat Finucane and Rosemary Nelson, human rights lawyers who were allegedly
murdered by Loyalist paramilitaries in collusion with the State. See Press Release, Dep't
of Foreign Affairs, Government of Ireland, Appointment OfiJudge To Investigate Alle-
gations Of Collusion (May 29, 2002), available at http://www.irlgov.ie/iveagh/informa-
tion/display.asp?ID=966; see also STATE DEPARTMENT, DEPARTMENT OF STATE HUMAN
RIGHTrs REPORTS FOR 2000, UNIT] D KINGDOM, U.S. DEPARTMENTI OF STATE para. la
(2001).
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widely used in Northern Ireland and elsewhere. The first model,
which has been extensively employed in the United Kingdom
("UK"), is the public inquiry. The other model, more common
in other jurisdictions, is the truth commission, like those from
South America and South Africa. A public inquiry is a highly
legal model, albeit one which operates under political con-
straints, usually examining one particular event or occurrence.
A truth commission is a much more overtly political model, with
less strict rules of procedure and evidence and usually examines
a broad spectrum of events and the issues arising from them.
Nonetheless, the use of the law is an important element in this
latter model. The success of the investigation and the choice of
model will depend largely upon the intended outcome of the
process. The commonly stated intention of such a process is to
uncover the truth, to establish an accurate version of events, and
to provide accountability. A secondary outcome of such a pro-
cess can be the construction of a shared history or "memory,"
and the laying to rest of deeply controversial events. It can how-
ever be argued that States institute such processes to give legal
cover to governments and justify or minimize their actions, while
constructing an official version or "memory" that denies the
original abuse. This latter argument is one that can be made in
respect of the State's response to demands for inquiries in
Northern Ireland.
A. The Context in Northern Ireland
The violent political conflict of the last three decades has
been reflected in many areas, but perhaps most markedly in po-
licing and in the use of force by the State. Northern Ireland has
been policed in the main by the Royal Ulster Constabulary
("RUC"), which is now known as the Police Service of Northern
Ireland.7 However, the British Army, including the locally re-
cruited Ulster Defence Regiment ("UDR"), now known as the
Royal Irish Regiment ("RIR"), has played a significant role in
7. The name change was one of the recommendations of the Independent Com-
mission on Policing in Northern Ireland. REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON
POLICING IN NORTHERN IRELAND, A NEW BEGINNING: POLICING IN NORTHERN IRELAND
para. 17.6 (1999) (otherwise known as PATTEN REPORT). The name change was imple-
mented by Sec. 1 of the Police Act 2000 (Eng.). The Patten Commission was set up as
part of the Agreement Reached in the Muluti-Party Negotiations, Sec. 9, Apr. 10, 1998
[hereinafter Good Friday Agreement].
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policing and in the conflict.' Northern Ireland's policing ar-
rangements are, and have been, quite different from the rest of
the UK. For example, unlike the other police forces operating
in the UK, RUC members are routinely armed. The violence of
the conflict has had a serious impact upon the police. Many of-
ficers have been killed 9 and maimed by paramilitary organiza-
tions, and many have seen their colleagues and friends mur-
dered.
In examining the context of public inquiries and their use
in Northern Ireland it is necessary to consider some criticisms of
the way in which Northern Ireland has been policed, as a num-
ber of those inquiries which have taken place have been set up
in response to criticism of many aspects of policing, including
the use of lethal force, interrogation methods and the mainte-
nance of public order. Some aspects of Northern Ireland's po-
licing were carried out by the British Army, which was directly
responsible for the deaths on Bloody Sunday, but much of it was
done by the RUC. Further, the failure of the domestic accounta-
bility mechanisms, including public inquiries, has driven the
conflict and has made policing and security ever more contro-
versial in the process, a factor in the Bloody Sunday Inquiry.
There has been a long history of criticism of policing meth-
ods"' and the RUC and its members have been the subject of
numerous serious allegations of human rights abuses in the past
thirty years."' One U.S. State Department Human Rights report
noted that "some members of the [RUC] have committed
8. The Ulster Defence Regiment was set up on April 1, 1970, in response to recom-
mendations made in the Hunt Report. See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTrEE ON
POLICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND, Cmd. 535 HMSO (1969).
9. See POLICE SERVICE O1 NORTHERN IRELIANI), SECURITY SITUATION AND PUBLIC OR-
DER, at http://www.psni.police.uk/stats/securitysit.shtml (providing statistics that 302
police officers have been killed since 1969).
10. To the extent that a series of government inquiries have been held, see cases
cited infra n.33. A succession of United Nations ("U.N.") and European bodies has also
criticized the policing and other security measures in Northern Ireland.
11. See COMMISSION ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, SUBMISSION TO TIHE UN
CoMMrrTEE AGAINST TORTURE (Nov. 1991); see also HUMAN RIGHTs WATCHI, HELSINKI
AIrCi-i CHILDREN IN NORTIFRN IRFI.AND: ABUSED BY SECURITY FORCES AND PARAMILITA-
RIES (1992); AMNESTY INTERNAIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL UNITED KINGDOM: ALLE-
GATIONS OF ILLTREATMENT IN NORTHERN IREIAND (1991); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PO-
LITICAL KILLINGS IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1994); NORFIERN IRELAND HUMAN RIGITS As-
SEMBLY, LIBERTY BROKEN COVENANTS: VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAI. LAW IN NORTHERN
IRELAND (1992).
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human rights abuse.., police occasionally abused detainees."' 12
It also observed "widespread antipathy in the Catholic commu-
nity to the security forces."1 While the antipathy is confined to
the Nationalist community, there is evidence that many living in
Loyalist areas experience problems with the RUC. 4
Criticism of the police in Northern Ireland is often misun-
derstood and interpreted as hostility. While this may have been
understandable given the sustained attacks on the RUC, and the
deaths and injuries sustained by its members during the conflict
in Northern Ireland, such an approach is both unhelpful and
unprofessional. There have been many controversies surround-
ing the police and army activities in Northern Ireland, including
iconic cases like Bloody Sunday and the murder of defense law-
yers, Pat Finucane and Rosemary Nelson, both of whom were
allegedly murdered by Loyalist paramilitaries acting in collusion
with British Military Intelligence and the RUC. 5 There are nu-
merous other cases, less well-known but no less controversial,
such as the cluster of murders carried out in the mid-Ulster area
of Northern Ireland by off-duty police officers and UDR mem-
bers.'6 There have been numerous attempts to require the State
to institute independent investigations into all of these cases as
an alternative to the investigations carried out by various police
forces on behalf of the State itself, but these have been largely
unsuccessful. The response by the State in Northern Ireland has
characteristically been to deny the existence of the abuses or to
justify their occurrence. Occasionally, it has instituted what it
has termed "independent judicial inquiries" in response to pres-
sure, primarily by international human rights non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs") and interested governments. However,
it may be observed that the remit and the scope of these inquir-
ies, among other things, were so strictly drawn as to prevent any
real criticism of the State. As Ellison and Smyth observe about
12. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN Ri;IITS AND LABOUR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
UNITED KINGDOM REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACHICES FOR 1996 1 (1997).
13. Id. at 18.
14. See ROBBIE McVEIGII, COMMITTEFE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OFJUSTICE, "ITS PART
OF LIFE HERE," THE SECURITY FORCES AND HARASSMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1994).
15. LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHiTrs, BEYOND COILLUSION: TIHE UK SECUR-
rry FORCFS AND THE MURDER OF PAT FINUCANE (2002).
16. See RAYMOND MURRAY, THE SAS IN IRELAND 1969-1989 31-44 (1990).
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the Bennett Report:"
[it] was essentially an attempt to defuse the questions sur-
rounding detention and interrogation without having to con-
front the more basic questions inherent in the strategy of de-
politicising and de-legitimising the aspirations of large num-
bers of nationalists, whether supporters of the IRA or more
moderate constitutional nationalists. 18
Thus, those calling for any new sequence of inquiries into
the events in Northern Ireland should be aware of the possibility
that all such inquiries do is allow the State to insulate itself
against criticism of its behaviour. Because of this, relatives of
those killed by the State, as well as human rights non-govern-
mental organizations ("NGOs"), have chosen, more recently, to
use international legal mechanisms to focus attention on the vio-
lations. Specifically, they have been able to avail themselves of
the right of individual complaint permitted under the European
Convention on Human Rights ("European Convention"). 9 A
number of cases relating to the right to life have been heard by
the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR"), most perti-
nently Jordan et al. v. United Kingdom.2" These cases build upon
previous jurisprudence to amplify the procedural right under
Article 2 of the European Convention2 ' - the right of the rela-
tives of those killed by the State to an independent effective in-
vestigation. 2 In Jordan, the ECtHR found that the families' right
to such an investigation had been breached and was highly criti-
cal of the police investigations and the inquest procedures em-
17. REPORT OF THE COMMIrEE OF INQUIRY INTO POLICE INTERROGATION PROCE-
DURES IN NORTHERN IRElAND, 1979, Cmnd. 7497.
18. GRAHAM ELLISON &JiM SMYTH, TIIF CROWNED HARP: POLICING NORTHIIERN IRE-
LAND 97 (2000). See below for a more detailed consideration of this point.
19. The UK signed the European Convention on Human Rights ("European Con-
vention") in 1951. It signed the First Protocol to the Convention, allowing individuals
to petition the Court, in 1966.
20. Judgment in five associated cases was given in May 2001. The cases were Jordan
v. UK, Appl. no. 24746/94; [2001] EUR.CT.HuM.R. 247; Kelly v. UK, Appl. no. 300054/
96; McKerr v. UK, Appl. no. 28883/94, reported in 34 EUR. HUM. R. Ru'. 553 (2002);
Shanaghan v. UK, Appl. no. 37715/97.
21. European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 2, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953). Article 2 states:
"[e]veryone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life
intentionally." Id.
22. Fionnuala Nf Aoldin, Thtth Telling, Accountability and the Right to Life in Northern
Ireland. 5 EuR. HUM. R. L. REV. 572-90 (2002).
THE GOVERNMENT OF MEMORY
ployed by the State to investigate the deaths. After this case,
many other families who have had relatives killed by the State
have initiated legal proceedings. 23
Essentially, demands for public inquiries are driven by a
need for an accounting for the events and a desire to see the
rule of law restored. Thus, any response to these demands must
be one that will facilitate an independent investigation, an im-
portant side-effect of which may be the bolstering of the confi-
dence of the general public in the legal and judicial process. A
failure to carry out an independent investigation may well have a
catastrophic event on the rule of law. An independent investiga-
tion is one that is not, either in fact or perception, a concession
to State objections or to denials that abuses took place. Any
mechanism must treat those who are most affected by the events
as the key stakeholders in the outcome of the investigation: its
key concerns must not be the position of the State, which has
carried out the dubious acts. The responsibility of the investiga-
tion is to those to whom the acts were done, and who have the
most to complain about if a proper investigation is not carried
out. This is something that is at the heart of the ECHR recent
jurisprudence on the matter. As the Court observed:
... the right of the family of the deceased whose death is
under investigation to participate in the proceedings requires
that the procedures adopted ensure the requisite protection
of their interests, which may be in direct conflict with those of
the police or security forces implicated in the events.2 4
This important principle seems to have been grasped by UK
Prime Minister Tony Blair in advance of the ECtHRjudgements
in May 2001. When he announced the setting up of the Bloody
Sunday Inquiry, he said:
I am setting up the inquiry because the relatives of those who
died that day have the right to expect us, their Government
- the British Government - to try to establish the truth of
the events of that day. I am interested in their interests, their
concerns and their sense of grievance, not in the sense of
grievance of people who have engaged in terrorist acts.25
23. Press Release, Derry families mount legal action against DPP, Pat Finucane
Centre (Feb. 20, 2002), available at http://www.serve.com/pfc/euro/euro]5032002b.
html.
24. McKerr, Appl. no. 28883/94, at para. 148.
25. Hansard, Commons Debates, Jan. 29, 1998, at Col 517.
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This is the standard by which any proposed public inquiry
must be judged. The problem is that despite Mr. Blair's re-
marks, the government of the UK has thus far not met this stan-
dard. Yet, the rule of law and international human rights norms
require it. The concerns raised about the behaviour and disposi-
tion of the State during the conflict in Northern Ireland are so
serious that they will not simply vanish with time. It is therefore
necessary to establish some form of independent investigatory
process that is capable of uncovering and reporting the truth
and allocating responsibility for the events complained of. This
is the inevitable conclusion of the process opened up by the
findings of the ECtHR in Jordan et al. The difficulty may be that
no inquiry, public or otherwise, which is set up by the UK, is
capable of satisfying this standard, because any such inquiry is
likely to be controlled in its material aspects by the sections of
the State who have most to lose from the reporting of the truth.
B. Public Inquiries in the UK Constitutional Framework
There are two principal sorts of inquiries in the UK, statu-
tory and non-statutory. 2" Both types of inquiries have been em-
ployed in the past in Northern Ireland. All inquiries are gov-
erned by two well-established principles. First, witnesses must be
treated fairly.27 The definition of "fairness" is to be found in
the six Salmon Principles, which laid down how witnesses be-
fore tribunals of inquiry were to be treated. These principles
emerged from the Report of the Royal Commission on Tribunals
of Inquiry, 28 set up after a political scandal involving a cabinet
26. See JOHN McELDOWNEY, PUBLIC LAw ch. 14 (2d ed. 1997).
27. See Blom Cooper, Witnesses and the Scott Inquity, I PuB. L. 1-3 (1994); Blota
Cooper, Witnesses before public inquires: an example of unfairness, 1 PuB. L. 11-12 (1996);
Howe, G., Procedure at the Scott Inquiry, 3 PU. L. 445-60 (1996); Scott, R., Procedures at
Inquiries: The Duty to Be Fair, 11 L. Q. RFV. 596 (1995).
28. See REPORr OF -i-. ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRIBUNALS OF INQUIRY, 1966, Cmnd.
3121. The Royal Commission, chaired by Lord Salmon, listed six principles:
1. Before any person becomes involved in an inquiry, the Tribunal must be
satisfied that there are circumstances which affect him and which the Tribunal
proposes to investigate.
2. Before any person who is involved in an inquiry is called as a witness, he
should be informed of any allegations which are made against him and of the
substance of the evidence in support of them
3. He should be given adequate opportunity of preparing his case and of be-
ing advised by legal advisers; his legal expenses should normally be met out of
public funds
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minster, John Profumo, was investigated by way of a public in-
quiry. Disquiet at how aspects of that inquiry had been handled
and in particular comments from Lord Denning, the judge car-
rying out the inquiry, complaining that he had been required to
act as investigator and adjudicator led to the establishment of
the Royal Commission. 29
The second principle governing inquiries is that "the [iln-
quiry's work [should] be conducted with efficiency and as much
expedition as is practicable."3"' Inquiries are also now governed
by the Human Rights Act 1998.31 Additionally, they must com-
ply with international human rights standards.
There has been a marked increase in England and Wales of
the use of the public inquiry model as a mode of legal process.
This is partly a consequence of the phenomenal growth of ad-
ministrative law and of the "quango-isation" of public power in
the UK. It is also a product of the legal and political cultures
engendered by decades of judicial review and the increasing su-
pervision of public power by the courts. Public inquiries were
sought by, for example, victims of rail crashes, defendants in
arms export trials, and families of patients murdered by their
doctors, and they were granted by successive UK governments,
keen to demonstrate that they had nothing to hide and much to
learn.
Their use has been significantly more limited in Northern
Ireland and it is therefore worth reflecting upon some key ques-
tions about the nature of public inquiries, how they operate, and
what ends they serve.
4. He should be given the opportunity of being examined by his own solicitor
or counsel and of stating his case in public at the Inquiry.
5. Any material witnesses he wishes called at the Inquiry should, if reasonably
practicable, be heard.
6. He should have the opportunity of testing by cross-examination conducted
by his own solicitor or cotnsel any evidence which may affect him.
Id. [hereinafter Salmon Principles].
29. See Winetrobe, B. Inquiries After Scott: The Return Of The Tibunal Of Inquiry, I
PUB. L. 18-31, at 19-21 (1997).
30. ScowT REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS ABOUT INQUIRY PROCEDURES, Pt. 4, Sec. K,
ch.1, para. K1.2.
31. R v. Right Honourable Lord Saville Of Newdigate et al. (EX PARTE A; B; D; H;
J; K; M; 0; Q R; S; U; V; Z And AC And AD), [2001] EWCA Civ. 2048 (Ct. Of Appeal Of
England & Wales, Civ. Div.), July 28, 1999, at para. 31 (sitting As Bloody Sunday In-
quiry); Lord Saville of Newdigate & Ors v. Widgery Soldiers & Ors [2001] EWCA Civ.
2048 (Ct. of Appeal of England & Wales, Civ. Div.) (Dec. 19, 2001), at paras. 5-6.
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1. What Are Inquiries For?
Inquiries are held in one or other of three sets of circum-
stances. First, when the facts of a situation require public investi-
gation. Here, the facts are not known and public concern is
such that the investigation needs to be conducted publicly (e.g.,
judicial inquiries into rail crashes). Second, when the facts of a
situation are contested, that is there are at least two, perhaps
more, competing versions of events, and those versions need to
be either reconciled or the official record settled in favor of one
(e.g., the events of Bloody Sunday; the police investigation of the
Stephen Lawrence murder, 2 etc.). The third type of circum-
stance is when the facts of a situation are known, have been offi-
cially denied or contested in the past, but have come to be gen-
erally accepted. Thus, an official mechanism is required to ac-
knowledge that the denial was wrong and the unofficial version
was the correct one. Many truth commissions fulfill similar func-
tions as this third category.
2. Why Are Inquiries Demanded?
Demands for inquiries are often made on the basis that peo-
ple wish to "know the truth." A deeper examination of these
demands reveals that people sometimes say: "I want the truth,"
when generally they mean: "I want my truth acknowledged."
There are some cases where the truth is buried and must be ex-
cavated, or where the finer details of the events complained of
are not known and the purpose of the public investigation or
inquiry is to uncover that truth or those facts. However, it is
sometimes the case that people call for public inquiries because
they believe that they know the essential truth about a situation
and simply want the state to "own up." Long campaigns for "the
truth" or for new public inquiries to be set up also heighten this
expectation.
3. Why Do Governments Agree To Inquiries?
More interesting still, is the matter of why governments
32. See generally BRIAN CATrHCART, TifF CASE OF SEPHEN LAWRENCE (2000). Ste-
phen Lawrence was a black teenager who was killed in a racist knife attack in Elhham,
South London, on April 22, 1993. His murder was unsatisfactorily investigated by the
London Metropolitan Police and became a cause celebre and a defining moment in the
public discourse about racism in Britain. Id.
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agree to hold public inquiries. Those who represent the State
argue that it is because they are interested in upholding demo-
cratic values and practices, but many observers are not con-
vinced. It is more likely that inquires are often set up when pub-
lic concern is such, that the relevant authority has to be seen to
be doing something to address the public controversy. It seems
that on many occasions, public inquiries are employed by gov-
ernments not as a tool to find truth and establish accountability
for human rights violations, but as a way of deflecting criticism
and avoiding blame. A government can point to the findings of
a public inquiry as verification of its claim that no wrong was
committed and thus avoid both the blame for the wrong itself
and the failure to do anything about it. Public inquiries thus
serve a dual purpose - denying the harm done and providing a
shield against claims that the state permits impunity. This point
is explored in more detail below in relation to a number of pub-
lic inquiries held in Northern Ireland.
II. PUBLIC INQUIRIES AND THE CONFLICT IN
NORTHERN IRELAND
There have been numerous official reports into security
practices and policies in Northern Ireland,3" but there have
been only six judicial inquiries related to the conflict.34 These
are, in chronological order of their reports: the Cameron In-
quiry into the civil disturbances in 1968;" the Compton Inquiry
into allegations of State brutality associated with internment; 6
33. A number of these were chaired by judges, such as REPORT OF THE COMMIS-
SION To CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURES To DEAL WITH TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN NORTH-
ERN IRELAND, 1972, Cmnd. 5185; REPORT OF A COMMITEE To CONSIDER, IN THE CON-
TEXT OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS, MEASURES To DEAL WITH TERRORISM IN
NORTHERN IRELAND, 1975, Cmnd. 5847. These, specifically, did not investigate allega-
tions of human rights violations although they were generally set up to address public
concern. Compare REPOWR OF THE COMMITFEE OF INQUIRY INTO POLICE INTERROGATION
PROCEDURES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1979, Cmnd. 7497 (creating the Bennett Inquiry
into police interrogation practices in direct response to such concerns, and specifically,
the public fury after the publication of an Amnesty International Report). See AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL REPORT, infra n.45 and accompanying text.
34. There were other bodies, set up to review policies and practices, which pub-
lished reports and made recommendations, such as REVIEW BODY ON LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1970, Cmnd. 546, which examined the structure and pow-
ers of local government, but these were not judicial "public inquiries".
35. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNOR OF NORTHERN IRE-
LAND, 1969, Cmnd. 532 [hereinafter DISTURBANCES IN NORT1-ERN IRELAND].
36. REPORT OF THE ENQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE SECURITY FORCES OF
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the Parker Inquiry, set up to examine the procedures for the
interrogation of terrorist suspects; 7 the Widgery Inquiry, which
was the first inquiry into Bloody Sunday; 8 the Scarman Inquiry
into the government of Northern Ireland and the civil distur-
bances in 1969,"' and the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, under Lord
Saville and others, which is the second inquiry into the events of
Bloody Sunday."' Three of these inquiries - Scarman, Widgery
and the Bloody Sunday Inquiry - were or are Tribunals of In-
quiry, set up under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act
1921. The others were either ad hoc or statutory. They were all
set up in response to public and international concern about
activities by the State and allegations of human rights violations
arising from those activities. With the exception of the Tribu-
nals of Inquiry, which are required by statute to sit in public, all
of the inquiries sat in private. One inquiry chair gave the reason
for this in his report:
The Secretary of State also informed us that in order to en-
sure the personal safety of members of the security forces
against whom allegations might be made, it was necessary that
our Enquiry should be undertaken in private and that there
should be no opportunity for a confrontation between complaintants




One might wonder why it was necessary to prevent such a
confrontation. One established way to test the validity of such
allegations is to have those who made the allegations confront
those who denied them. It can be speculated that it was because
such a confrontation might generate fuirther publicity for the
complaintants' case, something the State perhaps wished to pre-
PHYSICAL IRUTALI FY IN NORTHERN IRELAIND ARISING OUT OF EVENTS ON THE 9rit AucusT,
1971, CMND. 4832 [HEREINAFTER BRUTALITY IN NORTIIFRN IRELAND].
37. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRIVY COUNSELLORS APPOINTED T1O CONSIDER
AUTHORISED PROCEDURES FOR THE INTERROGATION OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF TERRORISM,
1972, Cmnd. 4901.
38. REPORT OF THE TRIBUNAL APPOINTED rO INQUIRE INTO THE EVENTS ON SUNDAY,
30 JANUARY 1972, WHICH LED TO LOSS OF LIFE IN CONNECFION WITH THE PROCESSION IN
LONDONDERRY ON THAT DAY, 1972, H.L. 101, H.C. 220.
39. REPORT OF TRIBUNAL OF INQUIRY INTO THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTHERN IRELAND
AND THE VIOLENCE AND CIVIL DISrURBANCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN 1969, 1972, CMND.
566.
40. The Bloody Sunday Inquiry, set tIP on January 30, 1998, has not yet finished
taking oral evidence. See hjra n.96 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
41. BRUTALITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND, supra n.36, at para. 3 (emphasis added).
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vent. Cameron, the first inquiry of the modern era in Northern
Ireland, was set up to investigate the early disturbances of the
conflict. It was less oblique about its reasons for taking evidence
in private:
[A] fter very careful deliberation we decided that it was in the
interest of the elucidation of the truth that our proceedings
should take place in private. By so doing we were of opinion
that witnesses would feel themselves able to speak with full
freedom and complete sincerity, and at the same time we
would avoid providing a propaganda platform for those who might
wish to make use of the Enquiry for such purposes. As the Enquiry
progressed we have been convinced that our initial decision
on this difficult point was well founded.4 2
Those who might make use of such "a propaganda plat-
form" were those who had most to complain about, that is, those
who had been victimized by the State. The language and senti-
ment of this passage is echoed in Prime Minister Heath's now
infamous exhortation to Lord Widgery at the outset of his in-
quiry into Bloody Sunday, to "never forget it is a propaganda war
we are fighting."4" At this early stage of the conflict, therefore,
those conducting inquiries were aware of the dangers of the
competing narratives of the events and were keen to minimize
the opportunities for the opposing narrative to be heard. The
opposing narrative was that of those who opposed the State.
That it was seen as propaganda demonstrates the attitude of the
State and those appointed by it to investigate its actions. For
them, human rights violations were a political battleground and
the refutation of the claims of those who had been subject to
those violations was a key aim. One way in which those claims
might be refuted was to hold an ostensibly independent inquiry
that exonerated the State.
By the time of the Bennett Inquiry ("Bennett") in 1979, 4 4
this approach had lost its lustre. Bennett was set up as a direct
response to the damning report produced by an Amnesty Inter-
national mission sent to Northern Ireland to examine claims of
42. DISTURBANCES IN NORTiERN IRELAND, supra n.35, at para. 3 (emphasis added.)
43. See generally DON MULLAN, EYEWITNESS BLOODY SUNDAY 270 (1997).
44. REPORT OF THE COMMIITEE OF INQUIRY INTO POLICE INTERROGATION PROCE-
DURES IN NORTHERN IRELAND. 1979, Cmnd. 7497.
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ill treatment and brutality during police interrogations.45 The
UK government barred Bennett from investigating individual
claims - "it was made clear that it was no part of [the] Commit-
tee's duty to inquire into individual allegations of maltreat-
ment. ' 4" Like its predecessors, the Bennett Committee sat in
private. The effect of this was to allow it to hear from the State,
but to discourage those who were the subject of the alleged ill
treatment from appearing before it. As the report remarks:
It was brought to our notice that other persons and organisa-
tions who might have had relevant information had refrained
from putting it forward because of the private character of
this inquiry and, as they saw it, its likely outcome. This was,
for us, a matter of regret.47
By this stage and especially after the debacle of Widgery, many
people in Northern Ireland, particularly in the Nationalist com-
munity, were quite cynical about inquiries set up by the UK gov-
ernment. The perception was that such inquiries were not inde-
pendent and always prioritized the interests of the State and its
agents. There were no further judicial inquiries into claims of
human rights violations, despite the continuing and serious na-
ture of the conflict, until the Bloody Sunday Inquiry was created
in 1998, almost twenty years later.
A. A Brief History of Bloody Sunday
On January 30, 1972, in the city of Derry48 in Northern Ire-
land, the British Army shot and killed thirteen men who were
taking part in a civil rights protest against internment,49 the
demonstration had been banned by the Northern Ireland gov-
45. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORTI OF AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION 10
NORTHERN IRFtANO (28 NOVEMBER-6 DECEMBER 1977) (1978).
46. Id. at ch. I, para. 2.
47. Id. at para. 11.
48. The city is officially named Londonderry, but the addition of the prefix
"London" in 1613 has never been accepted by the majority Nationalist population of
the city. Throughout this Article, the city is referred to as Derry. An alternative em-
ployed by other commentators is "Derry/Londonderry." See BRIAN LACEY, SIEGE CITV:
THE STORY OF DERRY & LONDONDERRY (1991) (providing a brief history of the vexed
history of the city's name).
49. On August 9, 1971 the Northern Ireland government had invoked Section 23
of the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act of 1922, which permitted internment -
that is arrest and detention without charge or trial.
2003] THE GOVERNMENT OF MEMORY 1163
ernment.50 Thirteen other men and one woman were wounded
by army gunfire and one of those died later as a result of his
wounds. Many other civilians were injured, alleging ill treatment
by the army.5 No soldiers were injured by civilians, although
the army alleged that soldiers had been injured by stones and
acid bombs.52  There were hundreds of eyewitnesses to the
events, which took place in a small section of the Bogside, a
working class Nationalist 3 area in the center of Derry. The Brit-
ish military authorities have always maintained54 that the intent
of the military operation was to arrest rioters and that firing by
the army was in response to a sustained attack upon them by the
Irish Republican Army ("IRA"), the illegal republican paramili-
tary organization.5" They said that they had shot gunmen and
50. At the time, Northern Ireland had its own provincial government. This gov-
ernment was suspended, partly as a result of the aftermath of Bloody Sunday in March
1972. See BRENDAN O'LEARY & JOHN MCCARRY, TiLE POLITICS OF ANTAGONISM: UNDER-
STANDING NORTHERN IRELAND 175-77(1993).
51. Statements taken by Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association,Jai. 31- Feb. 3,
1972. See MULLAN, supra n.43, at 240-56. Many similar statements have been made to
the new Bloody Sunday Inquiry.
52. A press statement from the British Army Press Office was issued at around 7:30
p.m. on the evening ofJanuary 30. Bloody Sunday Inquiry, Transcript, Main Hearings, Day
41, at 68 (6-25), 70(1-3) available at http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk [hereinaf-
ter Bloody Sunday Inquiry Transcript]. The allegations are apparently untrue: no such
victims were ever produced and no other evidence was ever presented to support the
claim.
53. The nomenclature of Northern Ireland's political identities is complex. The
following is a useful explanation:
Protestants are largely Unionists - people who want to maintain the union
with the United Kingdom. Most Catholics, on the other hand, are National-
ists, who wish to reunite with the Republic of Ireland, which has a population
of about 3.5 million, of whom 95 percent are Catholic. Some Unionists call
themselves "Loyalists," some of whom support the use of violence for political
ends. Some Nationalists call themselves "Republicans," some of whom support
the use of violence for political ends.
Human Rights in Northern Ireland, in HELSINKI WATCH 1 (1991).
54. The British Army issued a number of press statements and briefings, as did the
UK government in the wake of the killings. See e.g., Philip Howard, Press Given Detailed
Account of Arrest Force's Actions, TIMES, Feb, 1, 1972, at 4; see also, Dick Grogan & Martin
Cowley, Army Commander Describes Shooting as Defence Action, IR. TIMES,Jan. 31, 1972, at 1.
55. There are numerous histories of the IRA. See, e.g., J. BOWYER BELL, THE SECRET
ARMYI: THE IRA 1916-1979 (1989); TIM PAT COOGAN, THE IRA(1987); BRENDAN
O'BRIEN, T14E LONG WAR: THE IRA AND SINN FtIN FROM ARMED STRUGGLE TO THE PEACE
PROCESS (1995); PATRICK BIstiOI' & EAMONN MALLIE, THE PROVISIONAL IRA (1987); ED
MALONEY, THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE IRA (2002).
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bombers, a claim that outraged the civilian population. 56 From
the outset, the State's version of events was promulgated to the
media.5 ' The vast majority of civilian and press eyewitnesses sup-
ported the view that the army had opened fire on unarmed dem-
onstrators, some of whom had been engaged in stone-throw-
ing.5' A number of witnesses spoke of seeing two civilian
gunmen fire back at the army, after they had opened fire on the
demonstrators. Those witnesses were adamant that the firing
was in retaliation to the army and that it was brief and ineffec-
tive. 5' All civilian witnesses were certain that none of the dead
or wounded had been in possession of a gun or bomb, as the
army alleged.
There was shock and outrage at the events throughout Ire-
land." The Irish government recalled its London Ambassador
and demanded, among other things, the withdrawal of British
troops from Derry and an end to internment." A group of local
Catholic priests, who had been present at the events and some of
whom had been arrested, accused the British of "wilful mur-
der.""2 In the meantime, the local community organized a num-
ber of responses, including a mass statement taking exercise, car-
ried out at local venues." Many people also gave statements to
the Irish government."' Schools and workplaces throughout the
city closed for the three days between the killings and the mass
funeral three days later. 65 There were widespread demonstra-
tions throughout Ireland, in solidarity with the relatives of those
killed."" As Michael Farrell observes, "the whole nationalist com-
56. Simon Winchester, Bogsiders Bitter in Condemnation, GUARDIAN, Feb. I, 1972, at
1; It Was Wilful Murder, Say Priests, DERRYJ., Feb. 1, 1972, at 1.
57. See PETER PRINGLE & PHILIPJACOBSON, THOSE ARE REAL BULLETS, AREN'T THEY?
285-92 (2000).
58. This remains the case in the statements made to the new Bloody Sunday In-
quiry.
59. PRINGLE & JACOBSEN, supra n.58, at 183-84.
60. 13 Shot Dead At Deny March, IR. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1972, at 1.
61. Alan Smith, Irish Envoy Recalled in Protest, GUARDIAN, Feb. 1 1972, at 1.
62. It Was Wilful Murder, Say Priests, DERRYJ., Feb. 1 1972, at 1.
63. Over 500 statements were taken. These statements were taken under the aegis
of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association ("NICRA"), which had organized the
march. They became known, therefore, as "the NICRA statements."
64. GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND, THE IRISH GOVERNMENT'S ASSESSMENT OF THE
WIDGERY REPORT AND THE NEW MATERIAL PRESENTED ro THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN
JUNE 1997 5 (1998) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND].
65. Shut-Down As Deny Mourns Its Dead, DERRYJ., Feb. 1, 1972, at 1.
66. MICHAEL FARRELL. THE ORANGE STATE 289 (2d ed. 1980).
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munity was in revolt. 6 7
There were numerous protests abroad, including boycotts
of British products6" and calls for the withdrawal of the British
army.6" Hundreds of people died in the aftermath of Bloody
Sunday.7 ° Many commentators and historians have described it
as a "watershed" that triggered an upsurge in violence in North-
ern Ireland. It was clear that the situation in Northern Ireland
had become unmanageable and the regional parliament and ad-
ministration, which had governed Northern Ireland since parti-
tion in 1922, were prorogued on March 24, 1972.
B. The Widgery Tribunal and The Impact On The Rule Of Law
The UK government reacted to the events of Bloody Sunday
by supporting the army's version of the events. It also set up a
Tribunal of Inquiry, in the form of Lord Widgery, then the Lord
Chief Justice of England and Wales to investigate the killings.7'
His terms of reference were very narrowly drawn by Parliament7 2
and interpreted by Widgery himself, who "emphasised the nar-
rowness of the confines of the [i]nquiry. '' 73 The establishment
of the Inquiry effectively silenced public debate in the UK. The
laws of contempt were so stringently interpreted "that until the
Lord Chief Justice completes his inquiry, nobody may offer to
the British public any consecutive account of the events in
Derry.
' 74
67. Michael Farrell, LongMarch toFreedom, in TWENTVYEARS ON 63 (Michael Farrell
ed., 1988).
68. Michael Leapman, Two US Unions to Boycott British Exports, TIMES, Feb. 7 1972,
at 1.
69. William Millinship, Kennedy Calls for Direct Rule and Withdrawal of Troops, OB-
SERVER, Feb. 6, 1972, at 6.
70. 474 people died as a result of the unrest in 1972. The figure for the previous
year was 173.
71. The Tribunal of Inquiry is regarded as the most formal of public inquiries and
is set up to "inquire into a matter of urgent public importance." Tribunals of Inquiry
Act (Evidence)(Amendment), 1998, Sec. 1 (Eng.).
72. The terms of reference were: "[t]hat it is expedient that a Tribunal be estab-
lished for inquiring into a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely the
events on Sunday, 30 January which led to loss of life in connection with the procession
in Londonderry on that day." Report Of The Tribunal Appointed Under The Tribunals
Of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921, 1972, INQUIRY INTO THE EVENTS ON 30 JANUARY 1972
W,'HIC-I LED To Loss OF LIFE IN CONNECTION WITH THE PROCESSION IN LONDONDERRY
ON THAT DAY, H.L. 101, H.C. 220, at para. 1 [hereinafter WIDGERY REPORT].
73. Id. at para. 3.
74. The Problems Facing Widgerty: Can He Get the Facts? SUNDAY TIMES, Feb. 6, 1972, at
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There was much controversy about the Widgery Inquiry.
Some people in Northern Ireland argued for reluctant participa-
tion in the inquiry,7" while others took the view that it was simply
a "whitewash" and that taking part was a pointless exercise.7"
Widgery sat in Coleraine, a Unionist market town forty miles
away from Derry7 7 and refused to hear evidence from many of
the civilian eyewitnesses. He allowed soldiers to give evidence
anonymously and while disguised. Further, he refused to call as
witnesses all of those who had been wounded on the day." In
the end, his report, published in March 1972, surprised few but
offended many. It supported the State's version of events, find-
ing no substantive fault on the part of the Army and no "general
breakdown in discipline,' 7' although Widgery did speculate that
at one point, the army firing "bordered on the reckless." '' He
also found that while " [n]one of the dead or wounded is proved
to have been shot whilst handling a firearm or bomb.., there is
a strong suspicion that some . . . had been firing weapons or
handling bombs . . . and that yet others had been closely sup-
porting them."'" This last finding caused particular offense to
the families of the dead and to the wounded.1
2
13. THE SUNDAYTIMES Insight investigation was apparently 'spiked' when Lord Widgery
himself phoned its then editor, Harold Evans. See Cal McCrystal, In Cold Blood, INOEr'EN-
DENT, Jan. 18, 1992, at 20.
75. EDWARo DALY, MISTER ARE You A PRIsr? 207-08 (2000).
76. Cardinal, Bishop Demand Inquiry, IR. NEWS, Jan. 31, 1972, at 1; SDLP and Nation-
alists Will Boycott Inquity, DERRYJ., Feb. 4 1972, at 16; Widgery Unacceptable for Inquiry -
SDLP, IR. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1972, at 9; Eamonn McCann, Statement to the Bloody Sunday
Inquiry (Inq. Statement no. AM 77), at para. 2.
77. A nemo uncovered years later in the Public Records Office, documenting the
meeting between the then Prime Minister, Edward Heath, the Lord Chancellor Hail-
sham, and Lord Widgery records that there were objections to the Tribunal sitting inl
Derry. See Memorandum of a meeting at 10 Downing Street on 31 January 1972, repro-
duced in MULLAN, supra n.43, at 269-73 [hereinafter Downing Street Memorandum].
The Guildhall in Derly, where the current Inquiry sat until September 2002, is de-
scribed in the memo as "on the wrong side of the [River] Foyle," meaning located in a
Nationalist area. There was a history of the State preferring Coleraine over Derry; a few
years earlier, Coleraine had been controversially chosen as the site for Northern Ire-
land's second University, a decision which was viewed as politically discriminatory and
which led, in part, to the Outbreak of the modern phase of the conflict inl 1969.
78. He took evidence from seven of the thirteen wounded.
79. See WIDGERY REPORT, supra n.72, Summary of Conclusions, at 11.
80. Id. at 8.
81. Id. at 10.
82. Criticism of the Widgery Report has endured over the years. See British Irish
Rights Watch, Submission to the United Nations'Special Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitrary
Executions: The Murder of 13 Civilians by Soldiers of the Bitish Arny on "Bloody Sunday" (Jan.
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The events of Bloody Sunday and the investigation of those
events by the Widgery Tribunal left an indelible mark on North-
ern Ireland.8" For many, they demonstrated that the rule of law
had been completely abandoned by Britain in its attempts to
shore up unionist power in the State and that consequently, a
State of war existed. For some, the killings on Bloody Sunday
justified the use of violence against the State. For others, they
indicated that peaceful protest was impossible and eventually the
non-violent street protest of the civil rights movement withered
away. The immense sense of injustice and resentment that
Bloody Sunday and the Widgery Tribunal engendered, resulted
in deep distrust and further alienation from the State. As
Widgery's verdict became increasingly discredited, that sense of
injustice deepened, and "Bloody Sunday" became a by-word for
the perceived injustices visited by the State upon the Nationalist
community. For the State and its supporters, the matter was
closed. No soldier was prosecuted or disciplined for his actions
on Bloody Sunday. Indeed, the officer in charge of the para-
troopers was decorated by Queen Elizabeth II. For the general
population and the bulk of the British media, the Widgery In-
quiry's version of the facts was the truth.
Yet, Bloody Sunday could not be buried. It resulted in the
breakdown of trust by the Nationalist community in democratic
procedures, policing, and the judiciary, with serious conse-
quences for the people of Ireland and of Britain. The impact of
Bloody Sunday on the rule of law was unique and fundamental,
but it was also part of a process or continuum, beginning with
the introduction of the Falls "curfew"84 and internment the year
before. There had been a clear policy change on the part of the
authorities: a much harder "security" line was being taken8 5 and
30, 1972); see also Dermot Walsh, The Bloody Sunday Tribunal of Inqurby: A Resounding
Defeat for Truth, Justice and the Rule of Law, in BLOODY SUNDAY TRUST (1997); the Irish
Government's Assessment of the WIDGERY REPORT and the New Material Presented to
the British Government in June 1997, 1998, in GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND, supra n.64.
83. See generally PRINGLE & JACOBSON, supra n.57.
84. In July 1971, the British army imposed a thirty-six hour curfew on the Falls
Road in the Nationalist West Belfast. Four people died in the violence that followed. It
was regarded as a draconian measure by those who were subjected to it. See BISHOP &
MALLIE, supra n.55, at 159-61.
85. For the Nationalist population of Derry, it went further back to the death of
Samuel Devenney, who was assaulted by members of the RUC in 1969. See NIALL 6
DOCHARTAIG-i, From CIVIL RIGHTS TO ARMALITES: DERRY AND rHE BIRTH OF TFHE IRISH
TROUBLES 51-53 (1997).
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Bloody Sunday was a culmination of that policy. The shooting
dead of so many unarmed civilians, combined with the problem-
atic legal response that was Widgery, provided a graphic illustra-
tion that the State could act with impunity when committing
human rights abuses. As Fionnuala Nf Aolin points out:
The repercussions of Bloody Sunday have become embedded
in the cultural and political consciousness of Northern Ire-
land's nationalist community. It represents a watershed in
the relationship between minority community and [S] tate, ce-
menting a history of coercion and disaffection, compounded
by the [S]tate's willingness to exonerate the agents responsi-
ble for any acts which caused loss of life. The combination of
this incident and the ongoing internment process indicated
that due process had been entirely abandoned and that the
military approach now dominated the political agenda.~"
The partisan legal approach of the State was a defining fea-
ture of this period of the Northern Irish conflict. It was also a
catalyst for further deterioration in the relationship between the
Nationalist community and the State. The case can be made
that the aim of the Widgery Inquiry was not to find out the truth,
nor to provide accountability for the deaths, but to allow the
state to validate its behaviour. The Widgery Inquiry facilitated
the State's fielding any criticism of its actions by providing the
shield of a putative public independent investigation into the
events. It may be argued that this was understood by a number
of those associated with the Widgery Inquiry to be its aim, al-
though this was publicly denied when politicians and community
leaders aired such suspicions.87 Thus, the law was used to pro-
tect the State and the process of public inquiry used to insulate it
against domestic and international criticism. Lord Widgery, who
should have acted as "the pivotal trustee of the rule of law,""8
instead chose to behave as a participant in a "propaganda war. ''""t
Instead of being an independent public investigation, his tribu-
nal was a partisan defence of State action. The State realized
86. PoLTIcs oF FORCE, supra n.5, at 42-43.
87. Documents released by the UK Public Records Office in 1996 to legal repre-
sentatives of the families of the dead support this. One memo, fiom the Secretary of
the Inquiry records Lord Widgery as agreeing to the "piling up the evidence against the
deceased." See Walsh, supra n.82 at 57-58.
88. GOVERNMENT 01 IRWE1,XND, supra n.64, at 177.
89. Downing Street Memorandum, stipra n.77, at 270.
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that some official response was necessary to Bloody Sunday: es-
tablishing an inquiry but ensuring that it concluded in favour of
the "official version" allowed for the deflection of much public
criticism without disclosing the truth of the events. It was a sham
of accountability.
Great damage was done by this sham: those who had co-
operated with Widgery lost confidence in the rule of law in
Northern Ireland and were themselves undermined;90 those who
had argued against co-operation felt vindicated." Widgery, itself
was a factor in the acceleration of the conflict throughout 1972
and beyond. Those who were most critical took the view that if
the Lord Chief Justice of England, one of the most senior law
officials in the State would preside over such a travesty ofjustice,
how could any faith be maintained in the State to provide jus-
tice?" 2 It appeared to many that the legal process, which was
supposed to provide an alternative to violence and anarchy, had
assisted the State in covering up the killings of unarmed citizens.
Thus, law was appropriated to further the political will of the
State and in that process led to an almost complete alienation
from the State of a substantial section of its citizenry. That alien-
ated citizenry chose to make its objection to the state in the form
of civil strife and increasing support for violent acts against the
State. One of the factors in that increased support for such vio-
lence was the widespread feeling that there was no other option,
given the behaviour of the State, which had used the law to deny
the truth. Nonetheless, support for violence against the State
was by no means widespread or endemic: there were many who
opposed it."
The impact of the law is sometimes left out of an analysis of
history: the use of law in a response by States to events, and the
effect of that response upon communities, are sometimes under-
estimated, perhaps because the effect is not always directly ob-
servable. In the case of Bloody Sunday and of the conflict in
Northern Ireland in general, the role of law has been a pivotal
one. Law has been used by the State as a tool to further its politi-
90. See DALY, supra n.75, at 211.
91. See BARRY WHITE, JOHN HUME: STATESMAN OF THE TROUBLES 122, 126 (1984).
92. See Eamon McCann, The Civil Rights Campaigner, in HIDDEN TRUTHS: BLOODY
SUNDAY 1972 51 (Trisha Ziff ed., 1998).
93. Such as John Hume, later MP for the area, and the party he co-founded, the
SDLP. See Wi-iurE, supra n.91, at 121-32.
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cal aims and to implement its chosen policies in dealing with an
insurgent minority. Despite its claims, the State has not been
neutral in the conflict and has engaged law in an attempt to
deny its partisanship. One problem with the public inquiry
model typical in the UK is that its limited focus neglects this,
probably because the model is not designed to work in a context
like Northern Ireland, where the very nature of the State and its
existence are at issue. It may be that truth-finding processes
have been capable of examining the use of law by repressive re-
gimes because they usually occur when new political arrange-
ments replace an old regime."4 It is easier, politically, to find
fault with and apportion blame for the atrocities carried out by a
deposed regime than to admit that the existing administration
has been responsible for such serious human rights transgres-
sions. It may also be that the very formal nature of legal
processes prevents a coherent narrative emerging. By disallow-
ing elements of a witnesses' experience that are not directly evi-
dentially relevant, the monochrome of the legal process prevents
the details of such experiences that provide the colour in the
vivid picture of abuse and violation that narrative allows. Fur-
ther, legal processes tend to prosecute or investigate individuals,
not groups or governments and in focussing primarily on the
individual responsibility the law tends to obscure the pattern cre-
ated by abuses and its part in an overall programme of political
repression employed by governments. Thus truth is partly ob-
scured and the less rigid and formal form of truth processes may
facilitate a wider focus, a perspective which traditional legal
models are not capable of achieving."
The report of the Widgery Tribunal had another important
impact, this one less catastrophic. Its purported version of the
truth led to the community most affected by Bloody Sunday find-
ing alternative ways to remember it and to tell its version of the
truth. That, in turn, led to a campaign that culminated in the
institution by the Blair government of a second, unprecedented
Tribunal of Inquiry. What may be learned from this is that de-
spite the appropriation of law and legal processes, concerns
94. See Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative
Study, 16 HUM. Rrs. Q. 597, 607 (1994).
95. See e.g., Julie Mertus, Truth in a Box: The Limits of.Justice through Judicial Mecha-
nisms, in THE PoLITICS 0F MEMORY: TRUTH HEALING. AND SOCIALJUSTICE 150 (1fi Amadi-
urne & Abdullahi An-Na'im eds., 2000).
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about human rights abuses will not simply disappear after they
have been declared irrelevant or baseless by the State. Human
rights abuses are visited upon human beings with families, com-
munities and voices. Those voices, particularly in Northern Ire-
land, where communities and families remain tightly knit and
are often highly politicized by the experience of the conflict, are
not silenced by official verdicts, which decree their experiences
invalid. Thus, the creation of the new Bloody Sunday Inquiry
has been seen as a victory for the Bloody Sunday families and
their supporters. Notwithstanding that victory, the progress of
the inquiry, to date, has been a difficult experience for the fami-
lies.
C. The Bloody Sunday Inquiry
The Bloody Sunday Inquiry is chaired by Lord Saville of
Newdigate. Creating a precedent in the UK law, the three-mem-
ber panel was completed by judges from outside the UK: Chief
Justice William Hoyt from New Brunswick, Canada, and Sir Ed-
ward Sommers, a retired New Zealand High Courtjudge. In late
2000, Sir Edward retired for health reasons and was replaced by
a retired Australian judge, John Tuohy. The Inquiry first sat in
public in the Guildhall in Derry on April 3, 1998, and began oral
hearings on March 27, 2000. It moved to London to hear the
evidence of the military witnesses in September 2002, despite
strong protests from the relatives of the dead. The Inquiry is not
expected to conclude before late 2003 at the earliest and is un-
likely to report before 2004.
It is already the largest public inquiry in UK legal history."
It has cost, so far, £60.28 million and its final cost is estimated at
£120 million.17 Over 1,700 civilians, clergy, journalists, photog-
raphers, and current and former military personnel have been
interviewed, and have given statements, and it is expected that
96. There are over 129 volumes of evidence, including twelve volumes of photo-
graphs, thirty audiotapes and sixty-one videotapes having been circulated to interested
parties. The Bloody Sunday Inquiry, Frequently Asked Questions, at para. 24, available at
http://www.bloody-sunday-inquily.org.nk/index2.asp?p=7. The Inquiry has set up a
website, http://www.bloody-Sunday-inquiry.org, and many relevant documents, includ-
ing daily transcripts of the oral proceedings, rulings, judgements, press notices, and
other information is available from that website.
97. See, id. at para. 25; see also Bloody Sunday inquiby set to cost £lOOm, IR. TIMES, Dec.
17, 2001, at 5.
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the bulk of these witnesses will be called to give oral evidence. 98
As a Tribunal of Inquiry set up under the Tribunals of Inquiry
(Evidence) Act 1921, it is subject to the relevant domestic admin-
istrative law and practice, such as the Salmon Principles.99 It is
subject to judicial review by the English High Court and has al-
ready had a number of its rulings overturned by both the En-
glish Divisional Court and Court of Appeal.
°°
The purpose of a Tribunal of Inquiry is to "inquire into a
definite matter of urgent public importance. '' ... It is charged
with finding out the truth and with carrying out a public investi-
gation. The creation of the new inquiry suggested that public
confidence in Widgery, where it had existed, had eroded. This
suggests that the State has accepted that public confidence in
respect of the matter is still at issue. As the Prime Minister care-
fully put it in his statement to the House of Commons: "a new
inquiry can be justified only if an objective examination of the
material now available gives grounds for believing that the events
of that day should be looked at afresh, and the conclusions of
Lord Widgery re-examined." 1o2
While the Bloody Sunday Inquiry is a public inquiry in the
UK public law tradition, its subject matter is more akin to that
addressed by the various kinds of truth commission that have
developed in the last three decades across the world. Truth
commissions are often seen as a way to reckon with the past
human rights abuses committed during liberation conflicts (e.g.,
South Africa), or by ousted military regimes (e.g., Argentina).
They are more about recording and acknowledging past human
rights abuses than about providing precise public accountability
and thus, are often quasi-legal.
The task of the Inquiry may be described as being to ex-
amine afresh the evidence of what happened on Bloody Sunday,
to come to a reasoned set of findings, and to do so in a manner
that secures public confidence in the rule of law. Clearly, the
Inquiry's findings are important, but the process by which it ar-
rives at those findings is also vital. The Inquiry is taking place
amid allegations that the State covered up the truth about
98. See Bloody Sunday inquiry set to cost £100m, supra n.97, at 5.
99. Salmon Principles, supra n.28.
100. See infra nn.1 11-114 and accompanying text.
101. Tribunals of Inquiry Act, supra n.71, Sec. 1 (1).
102. Hansard, supra n.25, at Col. 502.
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Bloody Sunday. It is investigating an iconic event in a long his-
tory of contested activities by the State. It exists because the first
inquiry failed to secure confidence in the rule of law. Its task,
therefore, is to achieve "not only a sense ofjustice, but the elimi-
nation of a sense of injustice."""3 That is an extraordinarily diffi-
cult and complex task. The Inquiry has a client group that has
reason not to trust the UK government and the State. It has a
large group of former and serving military witnesses who are op-
posed to the Inquiry and whose legal representatives have suc-
cessfully challenged decisions taken by the Inquiry in the inter-
ests of the human rights of those who were killed on the grounds
that their human rights were at risk. It also has a British estab-
lishment that is largely hostile to it. Indeed, one newspaper went
so far as to describe the Inquiry as "a gesture of appeasement to
the IRA."' '
There is no doubt that the straitjacket of the Tribunal of
Inquiry model and the restraints of the UK Constitution have led
to an overly legal inquiry. While inquiries are legal processes,
they are intended to be a different kind of legal process than
trials - inquisitorial rather than adversarial. Yet, the oral hear-
ings of the Inquiry have frequently been highly adversarial. This
may be an inevitable consequence of the complex and contro-
versial nature of the material the Inquiry is investigating, com-
pounded by the deep mistrust between the parties, which has led
to a plethora of legal teams. However, more general conclusions
may be drawn from the manner in which the Inquiry has been
driven by law, practice, and court-rulings to become a very for-
mal, complicated process. In particular, such conclusions may
persuade those seeking a legal model for a truth commission in
Northern Ireland to look elsewhere than the Tribunals of In-
quiry (Evidence) Act 1921.
There are a number of causes of the ongoing difficulties
that face the Inquiry. While the Inquiry has made some unfortu-
nate errors and poor choices, many of the problems that have
arisen are either the fault of the model itself, or arise out of fac-
tors beyond its control. There are contrary expectations of the
103. M.Cherif Bassouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving justice: The Need for Ac-
countability, 59(4) L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 23 (1996).
104. See Mary Holland, Demand for Anonymity Threatens Peace Hopes, IR. TIMES, June
10, 1999, at 11 (reporting editorials fiorn THE DAH.Y TEtLEGRAPH).
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Inquiry, which has led to strains between the Inquiry and its "cli-
ent" group, the families, their lawyers and civilian witnesses. The
circumstances that led to the second inquiry created specific ex-
pectations amongst that "client group." The long campaign that
had been waged to achieve the second inquiry, the nature of the
community "remembering" of the events, and the background
of the Northern Ireland peace process led to expectations
among the families and their supporters that the Inquiry would
operate like a form of a truth commission. However, this was
not the expectation, nor indeed the intention of the Inquiry.
III. DEFINING TRUTH FINDING
The notion of "truth" is a difficult one both philosophically
and practically. The concept is particularly difficult in the con-
text of a conflict where even the nature of the conflict, that is
what the conflict was about, is contested. This is complicated
further by the elapse of thirty years and a conflict where law was
employed by the State to further its political ends. "Truth" is,
therefore, a particularly thorny concept. This is because what
people often mean when they use the term "truth" is acknowl-
edgement. What people frequently want from a truth process is
an acknowledgement of the violation of their rights, an admis-
sion that what was done was wrong. This is also important for
the purposes of accountability and reconstruction. Without ad-
mitting the wrong done, one may not prevent the future from
replicating the abuses of the past. In consequence, deciding
what is meant by "truth" should be the first task of any truth
process. This raises some difficult questions. For example, how
much information does one need to have in order to be satisfied
that one has the truth? In Northern Ireland, for example, is it
sufficient to know that the British army shot one's sister or that
the IRA killed one's father, or is it necessary to have greater de-
tail? Perhaps one requires the name of the combatant who car-
ried out the killing, or the identity of the politician responsible
for the policy being carried out.
Arriving at truth is another matter. Leaving aside the philo-
sophical arguments about whether it is possible to achieve a gen-
eral truth, " "5 a complicating element in any truth-finding pro-
105. See generally Angela Hegarty, Truth, justice & l econciliation? The Problem with
'Truth Processes, 2 GLOBAL REV. OF ETINo-Po TI'CS 97 (2002).
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cess, is how one compels those involved in human rights viola-
tions to own up to the facts. It is generally not in the interests of
former combatants on either side of a conflict to disclose facts
that implicate them in criminal activity and which do not serve
their version of history. In South Africa, this problem was ad-
dressed, with varying degrees of success, by the mechanism of
exchanging "truth-telling" for amnesty.' It is difficult to see
how this could be replicated in Northern Ireland, where the ma-
jority of paramilitary prisoners have been released, albeit on li-
cence which may be revoked if they engage in paramilitary activ-
ity,"" and where very few State agents have ever been held to
account for their role in the conflict.
Despite the fact that the Inquiry has stressed that it is not a
truth commission and that neither the 1921 Act nor the parlia-
mentary resolution which set up the Inquiry mentions the word
"truth" at all, all parties to the Inquiry repeatedly speak about
"finding the truth." This is quite a different aim than "investigat-
ing the events." In fact the purpose of the Inquiry, given the
history and context that surround it, makes it a form of truth-
finding exercise. Some aspects of the Inquiry, such as the pres-
ence of international judges and its interpretation of its remit -
for example the length of time spent by Counsel to the Tribunal
in his marathon opening statement on the social and historical
context - are further evidence that this inquiry may be inter-
preted as a form of truth process. This truth-finding function
has been obstructed by delays and challenges, primarily from the
military and the UK Ministry of Defence." 8 It may be that the
very formal model of a Tribunal of Inquiry is not the correct
format for a truth-finding exercise. That is, of course, provided
that the Inquiry is intended to be such an exercise. As noted
above, one must consider the proposition that inquiries are set
up by governments to permit the deflection of criticism without
actually providing accountability.
A. Why Should Inquiries Be Public In Nature?
Inquiries are held partly because the public has to be reas-
106. See PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR
AND ATROCITY 98-100 (2001).
107. See generally Kieran McEvoy, Prisoners, The Agreement and the Political Character of
the Northern Ireland Conflict, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1539 (1999).
108. See infra nn.111-114.
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sured about the investigation being undertaken into controver-
sial events that have undermined confidence in the rule of law.
Limiting the extent to which that inquiry is conducted in public
will inevitably lead to suspicions that a "cover-up" is taking place.
The public nature of inquiries is also essential in uncovering the
truth - investigations which are conducted in secret face both
practical and political hurdles in persuading their audiences that
they have arrived at the truth. As Lord Salmon himself observed:
[I]t is, in our view, of the greatest importance that hearings
before a Tribunal of Inquiry should be held in public. It is
only when the public is present that the public will have com-
plete confidence that everything possible has been done for
the purpose of arriving at the truth.1"1
Thus, in order for an inquiry to be a truth-finding process, it has
to take place in public. This inter-relationship between truth-
finding and public process has been a running motif of the
Bloody Sunday Inquiry, which has been severely hampered by
the limitations on its public nature imposed by the courts.
Prominent amongst the causes of the limitations has been the
invocation by the UK government of "national security" as a rea-
son to not disclose information relevant to the Inquiry's work.'"'
In a series of legal challenges to the Inquiry by representatives of
the soldiers, supported by the Ministry of Defence and paid for
out of public funds,'" it has been established that the vast major-
ity of the military witnesses may give evidence anonymously," 2
that they are entitled to give their oral evidence in Britain and
109. REPOR OF TI 1E ROYAL CoMIiSSION ON TRIBUNALS OF INQUIRY, supra n.28, at
para 115.
110. See Robert Verkaik, Soldiers Will Not Attend Bloody Sunday Inquiy, INDEPENDENT,
Dec. 20, 2000, at 8; see aLvo, SeanuIs McKinney, British Coms Could Stall Saville T7 tth, r.
News, Dec. 20, 2001, at I (quoting legal representatives and family members expressing
concern that repeated interventions by the English courts would prevent the truth
emerging).
111. Most of the former and serving military witnesses are represented by legal
teams that have been instructed and paid for by the Treasury Solicitor. In a number of
the judicial reviews their case has been supported directly by submissions from the Min-
istry of Defence.
112. Lord Saville of Newdigate & Ors v. Widgey Soldiers & Ors R, supra n.31.
They are known by cypher or an "Inquiry number," although their full names and de-
tails are known to the Inquiry itself. The relatives of the dead, the surviving wounded,
the media, and the general public do not officially know their names, although a num-
ber have been named or have identified themselves.
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are not required to appear before the Inquiry in Derry,"' and
that the bulk of police witnesses are entitled to give their evi-
dence from behind screens." 4 The cumulative effect of these
challenges has been to undermine the application of public jus-
tice.
The Northern Ireland courts considered this when examin-
ing the issue of whether police officers should be allowed to give
evidence from behind screens. Mr. Justice Kerr's view was that:
... there is a danger . .. in conflating the concept of the
public nature of the Inquiry with the asserted need for wit-
nesses to be identified and visible. The latter is relevant to
the degree of confidence that people may have in the out-
come of the Inquiry but the public nature of the proceeding
is not eliminated by allowing witnesses to give evidence from
behind screens. Put shortly, the Inquiry still takes place in
public although the proceedings are not as open as before.'
15
Yet, public inquiries are held partly because the public has
to be reassured that the investigation being undertaken into
what are controversial events which have undermined confi-
dence in the rule of law. One way in which that confidence is
restored is to conduct that inquiry in public. Any limitation on
that will hamper the truth-finding aspect of the Inquiry.
In the case of Bloody Sunday, the limitations upon the pub-
lic nature of the Inquiry are taking place at the behest and for
the benefit of those who are alleged to have been involved in the
unlawful killings of fourteen civilians and the wounding of four-
teen others. These limitations reflect those imposed at the
Widgery Inquiry, where soldiers gave evidence anonymously and
partly disguised, and which led to allegations of an official cover-
up. It is precisely because the outcome of this Inquiry must in-
spire confidence, where the previous Inquiry did not, that the
proceedings should be as open as possible. Diminishing the ex-
tent to which the inquiry is done in public gravely risks the pros-
113. Id.
114. In The Matter Of An Application by the Next of Kin of Gerard Donaghy for
Judicial Review and In the Matter Of A Decision Of The Bloody Sunday Inquiry, [2002]
NICA 25A-C (Feb. 7, 2002). These witnesses were seen while giving evidence by the
legal teams, but not the families of the dead, the surviving wounded, the media and the
general public.
115. In the Matter of an Application by Mary Doherty for Judicial Review, Judge-
ment of Kerr, J. Northern Ireland High Ct., Q. B. Div. (Crown Side), judgement deliv-
ered Feb. 19, 2002, at 15.
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pect of it uncovering the facts and establishing the truth, without
interference or obstruction by the State and in a fashion that
inspires confidence in its outcome and in the legal process gen-
erally. This has been a running controversy throughout the en-
tire progress of the inquiry to date and may well be a key factor
in the determination of the matter of public confidence. That
the majority of military witnesses are giving evidence anony-
mously and in England, coupled with the inquiry's decision to
allow a large number of serving and former police officers to
give evidence from behind screens, has raised the whole ques-
tion of what is meant by an "inquiry in public."
Comparisons may be drawn with other public inquiries in
the UK, where witnesses alleged to have been involved in the
killing of civilians were compelled to give evidence, despite
threats and serious public disorder.'" The case can be made
that, because the truth about the events of Bloody Sunday goes
to the heart of the State's involvement in the conflict in North-
ern Ireland, the State is unwilling to fully co-operate with the
inquiry it set up to uncover that truth. The approach of the
State is echoed in that of the English courts that have been un-
sympathetic to the families' attempts to establish their rights to
an independent inquiry. As Bernadette Devlin-McAliskey pithily
put it when she came to give evidence: "This [inquiry] should be
somewhere else, where the accused is not running the party."' 17
That lack of co-operation may fundamentally damage the In-
quiry in uncovering the truth. There is no reason to assume that
any other inquiry into the behaviour of the State in Northern
Ireland would face any less opposition.
B. The Meaning of the Right to Life
This opposition to the discovery of truth is formulated in
other ways - it is not presented as a policy or approach antitheti-
116. Consider the Stephen Lawrence inquiry, where those suspected of having
been involved in the murder were required to give oral evidence in London, despite
numerous unruly protests outside and invasions of the hearing room by militant protes-
ters. Lawrence Suspects Deny Involvement, GUARDIAN,June 30, 1998, at 1. No such protests
have taken place in respect of the current Bloody Sunday Inquiry, where the strongest
protest was a silent walk-out by the families of the dead, when police officers gave their
evidence from behind a screen.
117. See Bloody Sunday Inquiry Transcript, supra n.52, at 70 (11-12) (recounting
events from Tuesday, May 15, 2001, Day 112 of the proceedings).
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cal to truth. Instead a number of more subtle approaches are
employed, for example, the demands of "national security,"
which the state asserts require a non-disclosure of information.
Another approach has been to employ the strictures of Article 2
of the European Convention on Human Rights to drive forward
concerns that military and police personnel are at risk of their
lives from dissident republicans. This has meant that the rights
of the dead and their families, the victims of the alleged abuses,
have been set up against of the rights of soldiers and police of-
ficers.
In the legal challenges to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry under-
taken by the soldiers, the primary reason for the upholding of
these legal challenges has been the manner in which the courts
have chosen to apply Article 2 of the European Convention.
The Convention was incorporated into UK law by the Human
Rights Act 1998 and public authorities in the UK are under a
statutory duty to act compatibly with the Convention. 18 The is-
sue first arose when the Inquiry, as noted above, sought to dis-
close to the families, their legal teams and the general public the
full names, but not addresses nor any other personal details of
the military personnel involved in Bloody Sunday. The Inquiry
considered lengthy representations by representatives for the
soldiers that their lives were at risk from Republican paramilita-
ries in Northern Ireland, but concluded that "[a]fter the most
anxious consideration we have concluded that on the basis of
the material presently before us our duty to carry out a public
investigation overrides the concerns of the soldiers.""' 9
Those affected by the ruling challenged the decision in the
English Courts and the decision of the High Court of England
and Wales121 1 to uphold the challenge was confirmed by the
Court of Appeal in R v Lord Saville of Newdigate & Ors ex parte A &
Ors. '21 In an important passage, Lord Wolf observed that:
When a fundamental right such as the right to life is engaged,
the options available to the reasonable decision maker are
118. Human Rights Act 1998, Sec. 6 (Eng.).
119. Bloody Sunday Inquiry, Tribunal Ruling, May 5, 1999, at para. 23.
120. Right Honourable Lord Saville of Newdigate et al. (Sitting As Bloody Sunday
Inquiry) (EX PARTE A; B; D; H;J; K; M; 0; Q; R; S; U; V; Z AND AC AND AD), [1999]
EWHC Admin 556 (High Ct. ofJustice of England & Wales, Queen's Bench Div.) (June
17, 1999).
121. Lord Saville of Newdigate & Ors v. Widgery Soldiers & Ors., supra n.31.
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curtailed. They are curtailed because it is unreasonable to
reach a decision, which contravenes or could contravene
human rights unless there are sufficiently significant counter-
vailing considerations. In other words, it is not open to the
decision maker to risk interfering with fundamental rights in
the absence of compelling justification. Even the broadest
discretion is constrained by the need for there to be counter-
vailing circumstances justifying interference with human
rights. The courts will anxiously scrutinise the strength of the
countervailing circumstances and a degree of the interfer-
ence with the human right involved and then apply the test
accepted by Sir Thomas Bingham MR in R v Ministry of Defence
ex parte Smith [1996] QB 517.122
Thus, the court placed a premium upon the substantive Ar-
ticle 2 rights of the soldiers and preferred them over the proce-
dural Article 2 rights of the families. On one reading of the
case, the result was hardly surprising. After all, the rights of the
relatives of deceased individuals to an independent, effective in-
quiry into the circumstances of those deaths will always be
deemed to be subservient to the rights of living individuals who
say they are in fear of their lives. As the Bloody Sunday Inquiry
has put it:
Article 6 does not, in the circumstances of this Inquiry, ad-
vance the position of the families of those who were killed.
Article 2, in its procedural aspect, gives to those families the
entitlement to an open inquiry into the deaths that occurred.
That entitlement is necessarily qualified by the need to take
into account public interest immunity, especially where the
disclosure of information would place at risk the life of an-
other. This is simply to say again that the procedural aspects
of Article 2 cannot override its substantive aspects.'1
2 3
However, if one examines the reasons why the jurispru-
dence on the procedural aspects of Article 2 developed, this ap-
proach begins to unravel. The case law of the Court of Human
Rights developed so as to provide a method by which the sub-
stantive Article 2 rights of the dead could be posthumously as-
serted. This is no hollow assertion: it is important not simply so
that the injustice of the killings can be exposed, but so that fu-
122. Id. at paras. 1867E-G.
123. Bloody Sunday Inquiry, Ruling on Public Interest Immunity, Time-Delay Pro-
cedure, Anonymity, Screening and Venue Applications, Dec. 19, 2002, at para. 38.
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ture deaths may be prevented and the rule of law upheld. For
individuals killed by the State, the only remaining way to affirm
their substantive Article 2 rights is through the assertion by their
surviving relatives of their procedural rights to an independent,
effective investigation. The conflict is not in fact between the
substantive right to life of one group of individuals and the pro-
cedural rights of another group, but between the substantive
rights to life of two groups of individuals, one killed by the other.
The fact that the courts have chosen to frame the debate differ-
ently and thus to prefer the rights of the combatants over the
victims should not be allowed to obscure this important fact. As
the European Court of Human Rights observed in McKerr v. UK:
[T]he right of the family of the deceased whose death is
under investigation to participate in the proceedings requires
that the procedures adopted ensure the requisite protection
of their interests, which may be in direct conflict with those of
the police or security forces implicated in the events.
124
Properly implementing this means deciding first how the
"requisite protection" of the rights of the families may be
achieved. The approach of the UK courts in the application of
the ECtHR, Article 2 jurisprudence in the Bloody Sunday cases
has placed potentially serious limitations on these rights and has
almost certainly damaged the full investigation and disclosure of
the State's activities in depriving people of their lives. It may be
presumed that these courts would take a similar approach in the
future if asked to adjudicate conflicts between the rights of those
acting on behalf of the State and those whom they are accused
of harming. These conflicts will inevitably arise if other public
inquiries take place into the State's activities in Northern Ire-
land. The differing approaches taken by the domestic and inter-
national courts on this specific issue illustrate the dilemma. This
issue should not become a reason not to hold such public inquir-
ies, but instead, should prompt serious reflection on how best to
address it. Thus, one important consideration to emerge from
the progress of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry to date is what should
be the proper venue for adjudicating such conflicts.
124. McKerr v. UK, sulpa n.20, at para. 148.
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C. Acting Fairly?
Another aspect of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry's processes to
cause concern has been its approach to civilian witnesses. A
number of these witnesses have been very rigorously questioned
by counsel for the Inquiry and for the soldiers as to knowledge
they may have about the membership of various wings of the
IRA. The Inquiry has said that this is prompted by its view that
there was no other avenue open to the Inquiry in its inquisitorial
role. Lord Saville explained it thus: "it is our basic duty to dis-
cover the whole truth if the only way we can do that, unsatisfac-
tory though that is, is to ask questions about rumours and who
knew who and so on."12 5
In response to this approach, it may be argued that it is both
unfair and unproductive to press civilian witnesses as to who they
had heard might have been in the IRA. It is unfair, because the
vast majority of civilian witnesses do not know who was in the
IRA. 12  Nor are they legally represented during cross-examina-
tion. If they were, their legal representatives might observe that
such questions may be a breach of the Salmon principles, 127 as in
effect, witnesses are being asked what knowledge they have of
the membership of an organization, proscribed under UK law
and pursued for its activities, which amount to criminal offences.
Possession of such knowledge, therefore, amounts in law to
knowledge of a criminal conspiracy. Furthermore, refusal to
supply such information may amount to a criminal offence
under Section 89 (2) (c) of the Terrorism Act 2000.28 The wit-
nesses themselves probably do not possess this knowledge. How-
ever, as both counsel for the Inquiry and counsel for the various
soldiers have pressed a number of witnesses quite severely on
this issue, the implication is that they believe the witness has or
may have such information. The Salmon principles give clear
guidance on this: if a witness is going to be asked such ques-
125. Bloody Sunday Inquiry Transcripf, supra n.52, at Day 87, 7 (11-14).
126. See BISHOP & M,\ILLI, supra n.55. The IRA is a secret organization; its rules
on knowledge and disclosure of membership are fairly specific. Id.
127. Salmon Principles, supra n.28. Principle 2 states: "Before any person who is
involved in an inquiry is called as a witness, he should be informed of any allegations
which are made against him and of the substance of the evidence in support of them."
Id.
128. In Part VII, which applies only to Northern Ireland and preserves a section
from the previous incarnations of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts.
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tions, then the witness has the right to be informed in advance
of such questions.
This approach is also unfair because it might be observed
that civilian witnesses are being pursued by the Inquiry because
of something other individuals or organizations have failed to do.
Lord Saville's remarks quoted above support such an observa-
tion. It is a conclusion which is supported further by the fact
that the Inquiry has identified around forty individuals whom it
believes to have been connected to the IRA in Derry in 1972, but
of whom a very small number have thus far agreed to co-operate
with the Inquiry.129 As the Inquiry has subpoena powers, it
might be wondered why it does not simply require these individ-
uals to attend and give evidence, instead of badgering civilians
for information they may not possess.
While civilian witnesses were entitled to legal representation
when giving their written statements, it has been rare for such a
witness to be accompanied by counsel.' In the Inquiry's view,
they are the Inquiry's witnesses and as such need no specific le-
gal representation. Yet, when the military witnesses give evi-
dence, they do so in the presence of their counsel and they,
therefore, seem to be at an advantage before the Inquiry.
Lord Saville himself seemed unclear on this matter, when
he remarked that "there are plenty of barristers in this room act-
ing for the interested parties, the families and so on who I am
sure would be the first to raise the matter with us if they felt we
had not treated the citizens of this city properly."'3 1
The next day, counsel for the families rose to point out that
they were not instructed, by nor would they be able to defend,
civilian witnesses. As Mr Mansfield put it: "[w] e do not represent
witnesses other than the families we are personally responsible
for." 1
32
The civilian witnesses therefore are the sole purvey of the
Inquiry, whose eagerness to seek the truth may conflict with the
interests of civilian witnesses who are not legally represented.
129. Bloody Sunday Inquiry Transcript, supra n.52, Day 236, at 159 (22-23).
130. At least one such witness has in fact been refused such representation. Video-
tape: Witness: The Civilian Experience of The Bloody Sunday Inquiry, Interview with
Dr. Raymond McClean, Transcripts of Interviews conducted for Bloody Sunday Trust
(Jan. 30, 2002) (on file with the author).
131. Bloody Sunday Inquiry Transcript, supra n.52, Day 86, at 169 (14-18).
132. Id. Dav 87. at 9 (1,-15).
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There is some public concern about the treatment of civilian wit-
nesses 133 and in particular, the pressure by the Inquiry upon
these witnesses to name IRA members. 34 This pressure has
caused great apprehension among many of the civilian eyewit-
nesses and made the difficult experience of giving evidence all
the harder. 13 5
It seems that the Inquiry must carry out the difficult task of
satisfying the two well-established rules of acting fairly and effi-
ciently. Inquiries must be able to ask hard questions of wit-
nesses, but that must be done in a way that satisfies the obliga-
tion to the witnesses to treat them fairly.' 6
In his comment upon the Argentine junta-trials, Mark Osiel
notes that:
[I]n focusing on the acts and intentions of very top elites, the
courts not only missed the macro-picture: the story of mass
collaboration and institutional support for administrative bru-
tality. They also missed the micro-picture: the story of the
victims -the human experience of uncomprehending suffer-
ing that official brutality produced.' 7
In the case of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, this has interest-
ing parallels. Some of those called as witnesses also had relatives
killed by the State. Some had subsequently become involved in
paramilitary activity. Such witnesses found their credibility and
their evidence challenged. As Osiel observes:
... at the Argentine junta trial, witness-survivors found them-
selves facing questions concerning, for instance, their mem-
bership in guerrilla groups, questions identical to those their
abductors had asked them under torture; the experience of
public testimony was thus personally degrading, rather than
133. See Angela Hegarty, A Suspect Community?, DERRY Nf-ws, Sept. 27, 2001, at 10.
134. See e.g., Eamonn McDermott, Saville Shifts Sights, SUNDAY Bus. POST, Mar. 4
2001; see also Editorial, DERRYJ., Mar. 10, 2001 (on file with the author); Bloody Sunday
Inquiry Transcript, supra n.52, Day 87, at 4 (7-25) (reporting oral submissions by Richard
Harvey).
135. Transcripts of Interviews conducted for Bloody Sunday Trust, supra n.130.
136. See Louis Blom Cooper, Witnesses and the Scott Inquiry, PUB. L. 1-3 (Spring
1994); see also Louis Blom Cooper, Witnesses Before Public Inquiries: An Example of Unfair-
ness, PUB. L. 11-12 (Spring 1996); Geoffrey Howe, Procedure at the Scott inquiry, Pub. L.
(Autumn 1996) 445-60; Sir Richard Scott, Procedures at Inquiries - The Duty to Be Fair, 11
L. Q. REV. 596 (1995).
137. See OSIL., supra n.], at 103-04.
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empowering. 138
This raises questions about what effect the experience of giv-
ing evidence is having upon witnesses. At the halfway stage of
the Inquiry, just before it moved to London in September 2002,
the majority of witnesses had been local people, many of whom
had not been called before Widgery. Many reported the experi-
ence as a negative one,' 3 9 and questions remain about the fair-
ness of the process towards civilian witnesses. If the experience
of giving evidence leaves people less confident about the legal
process than before, then, one may ask, how is the purpose of
"restoring confidence in the rule of law" achieved? In truth
processes, cross-examination of witnesses is unusual. In such
proceedings, the purpose of the oral evidence is for the story,
the experience to be heard, acknowledged, and honoured. But
legal processes do not always accommodate such narratives. As
Julie Mertus has remarked: "the process and the language of law
transmutes individual experiences into a categorically neat
something else. Law does not permit a single witness to tell their
own coherent narrative; it chops their stories into digestible
parts."140
For those giving evidence to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, this
has a remarkable resonance. The experience of giving evidence
has frequently been a confusing, intimidating one. Witnsses face
phalanxes of lawyers, dozens of computer screens, and a multi-
tude of maps, photographs and written information. Their own
written statements, some given two or more years before, are
scanned and displayed on large screens, but there is no natural
narrative flow. Sections of those statements, those deemed rele-
vant by the lawyers, are selected for further analysis, and com-
pared to statements made thirty years ago14 ' or previously un-
seen transcripts of interviews given to journalists, over which the
witness may have had no control. This is, as Mertus observes, an
inevitable consequence of the legal process, but traumatic exper-
138. Id. at 104.
139. Transcripts of Interviews conducted for Bloody Sunday Tnst, supra n.130.
140. Mertus, supra n.95, at 150.
141. While the vast majority of those witnesses called by The Bloody Sunday In-
quiry were not called to give oral or written evidence to Widgery, many of them did
make brief written statements in the NICRA statement taking exercise (see MUL[AN,
supra n.43, at 32-39). These statements have been used as evidence by the Inquiry in
addition to the more contemporary written statements made to it.
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iences do not fit neatly into a series of files on a hard drive, accu-
rate, accessible, and complete at all times. Scant allowance is
made for the elapse of three decades or the chaos of the circum-
stances in which the memory was formed. The differences, how-
ever slight, between a witnesses' story now and thirty years ago
are subtly proffered as reasons to disbelieve the evidence and the
charge of murder against the State. Because all of the witnesses'
versions of events, spanning thirty years, do not exactly corre-
spond, they become unreliable.
There is little awareness that the manner and the language
in which people tell their stories to friends, communities, and
the media is necessarily different from the one which they will be
obliged to use when taking part in a legal hearing. The trauma
invoked when people are obliged to relive terrifying events and
the consequent display of emotion makes those people alto-
gether less reliable in the law's eyes than the calm recall of a civil
servant, a general or a prime minister, who did not witness the
events and who were not affected in the same way. It is this dis-
parity between what legal process will accept as 'truth' and that
of those who experienced the events, which causes some of the
greatest disjunction between victims and witnesses and the offi-
cial discourse. If legal processes are to be the only way in which
official discourse is constructed or by which the acknowledged
version of the truth can be arrived at, then the processes need to
be more flexible, more open and more disposed to accommo-
date victims' narratives.
D. The Role of Law
The infliction of human rights abuses gives rise to multi-fac-
eted legal, political, and social processes. While such abuses are
tragic for the individuals and families to whom they happen, and
in some cases become iconic for their communities, they also
become part of the fabric of those processes. As in Northern
Ireland, the denial of human rights abuses by their authors feeds
the next cycle of violence and abuse. When those in power en-
gage in violations of human rights and deny that they were
wrong, the harm done to the rule of law is palpable. Even
greater harm is done when legal processes are used to deny the
wrong done or are contorted to criminalize the activities of one
set of combatants but not another. It is useful to reflect, there-
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fore, upon the usefulness of law in both establishing truth and
healing memory.
It is probably the case that a very literal highly legal process
may not assist in examining the "truth" of those events. That
does not mean that the law is not a necessary element of any
truth-finding process, but it may be better employed as part of a
larger, more fluid framework. Law is simply one tool or path to
truth, not the sole means by which truth is obtained. Purely le-
gal processes are not right, and ceding the direction and control
of truth processes entirely to lawyers is not helpful.
Yet, if the law is such an imperfect tool, why bother with it at
all? It is because accountability is necessary to prevent perennial
impunity, and unless law officially corrects the authorized narra-
tive that no harm was done, the impunity and the damage done
by it persists. Legal truth processes may be imperfect but they
are necessary as it is only through law that the rule of law may be
restored. This is especially so in cases where the legal system has
been employed by the State in pursuit of its political objectives
during a conflict, as was the case in Northern Ireland.
It is equally necessary to be realistic about the capacity of
legal processes. Those who seek to use the law as a way of find-
ing the truth and of honouring their experiences should be
warned about its limits. They need to be aware that this will be a
painful, traumatic process, which will inevitably involve trade-offs
that leave many people unhappy. In this respect, truth-finding is
like the negotiation of peace agreements. What may also be very
difficult for people to accept is the necessary "myth-busting" that
goes along with truth-finding. Arriving at truth will, on occasion,
require the relinquishing of cherished ideas and folk tales about
iconic events, constructed through a community counter narra-
tive that evolved in opposition to the official version. Because of
this, and because of the trauma that reliving human rights
abuses necessarily brings, support mechanisms should be built
into the process at every stage for all of those who participate in
it, even those who, at the outset, may dismiss the need for such
support.
CONCLUSION: SOME PRINCIPLES FOR A TRUTH-FINDING
PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND
There is much interest about whether and what sort of truth
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process Northern Ireland should have. However, the purposes
of such a process would be better served by first determining the
benchmarks by which any model should be measured and then
going on to consider the design, of which there may be a num-
ber of permutations. From the themes that have emerged from
the international standards and out of the experience of public
inquiries to date in Northern Ireland, it is possible to construct a
rubric against which any proposed model may be assessed.
In advance of the establishment of any truth-finding pro-
cess, key questions should be decided, so that the answers to
those questions can inform the design of the process. For exam-
ple, what is the aim of the procedure: is it reconciliation, shared
memory, or acknowledgement? These may be confused in the
minds of the general public and political leaders, but they are
not interchangeable. The confusion over the definition of
"truth" must also be resolved before embarking on any truth
process, so that there is some degree of consensus on what is
meant by "truth" and crucially, on what is achievable in a truth
process. This may entail the negotiation among all the different
victims and combatants, a negotiation that may be describd as a
form of "precursor truth process."
The truth process itself must be capable of uncovering the
facts and establishing the truth, without interference or obstruc-
tion by the State. It should, therefore, have not just the neces-
sary powers of subpoena and discovery that a Tribunal of Inquiry
possesses, but it must also be genuinely independent of the State
in all its key aspects. The nature of the process must be such as
to inspire confidence in its outcome, primarily among its key
stake-holders, that is those who are entitled to it. It must seek to
repair of the rule of law and establish public confidence in the
legal process. It will do so if it complies with international
human rights standards. It will do so if it is not limited in its
truth-finding by the powerful and the self-interested. That is pri-
marily why the international standards place so much emphasis
on the rights of those who are the victims of human rights
abuses, because in such an equation, they are the powerless.
Self-evidently, the process should treat those involved fairly
and in doing so, should pay close regard to the manner in which
evidence is taken and witnesses are treated. It appears that ex-
tensive oral hearings in the context of a wholly legal process in-
evitably become adversarial and are perhaps damaging to those
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giving evidence. This may not be the best method by which peo-
ples' stories are recorded and acknowledged and other ways of
doing this should be explored. It will, however, be necessary in
the course of a process intended to provide accountability to test
the reliability of evidence. Some thought should be devoted in
advance, therefore, to the different categories of narratives, their
aims, and the different ways in which they can be accommo-
dated.
The question therefore remains: are public inquiries the
correct mechanism for finding truth and achieving justice? In
the course of the conflict in Northern Ireland, public inquiries
have not, so far, provided a proper means of making the State
accountable for its actions. That they have not done so is not
because the public inquiry is a deficient model, but because in
the main, these were public inquiries that were controlled in
their important aspects by those elements of the State that had
an interest in preventing accountability. Put simply, these were
not fully independent inquiries. This struggle between state in-
terests and truth-finding is illustrated by the difficulties that have
beset the Bloody Sunday Inquiry and is crystallized in the argu-
ments over what Article 2 and the right to life mean in the con-
text of that inquiry.
It may be that a variation on the public inquiry model, as it
has previously been used, could form the basis of the design. A
public inquiry, cognizant of all of the foregoing, in the form of
an investigating judicial panel replete with all necessary powers,
might be one way of undertaking truth-finding. However, it will
be necessary for there to be some form of external independent
"guarantor" who will adjudicate conflicts in the process. It is un-
likely that the UK courts could be that independent guaran-
tor, 142 given their attitude to the challenges to the Bloody Sun-
day Inquiry. Like many domestic courts confronted by the amu-
let of "national security," they have preferred to accept the case
made by the State rather than that of those who allege they are
its victims.'4 3 In the case of Bloody Sunday, the UK courts have
shown themselves consistently unwilling to unpack the reasons
142. See Stephen Livingstone, The Judiciary and Legal Profession in Transition, in
HUMAN RIGHTS, EQUALITY AND DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL IN NORTHERN IRELAND 143-55
(Colin Harvey ed., 2001) (considering the role of the Northern Irish courts during the
conflict).
143. See George Alexander, The Illusory Protection of Human Rights by National Courts
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for the findings by the UK security services that the military wit-
nesses are at a greater risk if they give evidence in Northern Ire-
land than in London. There is scant consideration given to the
fact that the security services are themselves an interested party
before the Inquiry. There appears to be little comprehension
that a security assessment emanating from the Ministry of De-
fence that supports the position taken by former employees of
the Ministry of Defence will be treated with downright suspicion
among sections of the population in Northern Ireland. These
security assessments provided the main basis on which the courts
acceded to all of the requests for judicial reviews by those repre-
senting the military and former soldiers. As one judge observed:
"[t] he conclusion that there was no objective reason for fear on
the part of the officers would itself have been perverse in the
light of the intelligence evidence."' 4 4
In essence, the truth-finding function of the Bloody Sunday
Inquiry is hampered because of the continuing struggle between
the official and unofficial versions of history, which it seeks to
resolve. Any truth process, even one which is as unofficial a
truth process as the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, needs to secure the
support of the combatants, as well as the victims and the wit-
nesses. 4 ' The evidence from the Inquiry is that achieving such
support is going to be very difficult. Perhaps this is an inevitable
consequence of the fact that, despite the Good Friday Agree-
ment and the huge reduction in violence, the Northern Irish
conflict is not yet settled. It may be that a resolution between
the different versions of history is not yet possible, if ever.
There was a reasonable presumption that the State, in set-
ting up the new inquiry, was preparing to abandon its defence of
its version of history, at least in respect of Bloody Sunday. This is
clearly not the case. It is this continuing contestation of the past
that compels the State to try to retain control, however covertly
and indirectly, over truth-seeking processes, such as the Bloody
Sunday Inquiry. It wishes to ensure that the official truth is its
version. There can be little doubt that the State will seek to do
During Periods of Emergevcy, 5 Hum. R-rs. L.J. 1 (1984) (stating that this is not an unusual
response).
144. Per Girvan,J., In the Matter o/an Application by the Next of Kin of Gerard Donaghy
forJudicial Review and In The Matter of a Decision of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, [2002] NICA
25B (Feb. 7, 2002).
145. Some of whom may also be combatants.
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the same with any new inquiries set up to investigate its activities.
Nor is the State the only party to the conflict with a history to
preserve - the paramilitary combatants and the organizations to
which they belonged also have an interest in denying aspects of
their activities and elevating others. If those involved in the con-
flict remain engaged in this battle for its meaning and use truth-
finding processes as a ground for that battle, then no domestic
mechanism can ever succeed in satisfying the requirements of
justice.
This may be an unsatisfactory conclusion, given the current
state of affairs in the international community, but perhaps a
solution is not to look to it as the adjudicator of such local con-
flicts, but to follow the model of the peace process itself and al-
low the two governments and the people of Ireland to be the
architects of a truth process. The Good Friday Agreement envis-
ages all-Ireland institutions and a number have been set up, by
way of international treaties signed by both governments, with
the necessary mechanisms arranged by way of enabling legisla-
tion in both jurisdictions.'46 This model might also work when
designing a truth process to address the unresolved legacies of
the conflict, the violence of the State and the paramilitaries.
However, such a body should be truly independent of either gov-
ernment and it should be possible, when designing such a pro-
cess, to build in the independent adjudication mechanisms nec-
essary to resolve the kinds of disputes that have arisen in the
Bloody Sunday Inquiry.
To borrow the language of the ECtHR, a truth process for
Northern Ireland must be an official, effective, public and a fully
independent investigation, capable of ensuring accountability in
practice as well as in theory and centrally involving the next of
kin. 14 7 Large sums of public money are likely to be expended on
such processes with the aim of achieving accountability and re-
establishing the rule of law. Nothing short of those standards
will deliver those aims. Critiques of the British public inquiry
model are not rejections of the need to find truth and provide
146. For example, the "cross-border bodies" or the "implementation bodies" set up
under the Agreement Establishing Implementation Bodies, Mar. 8, 1999, Ir.-U.K-N.Ir.,
available at http://www.irlgov.ie/iveagh/; see also Northern Ireland Act 1998, ch. 47
(Eng.).
147. These are the principles laid down by the ECtHR in Jordan et. al. v. UK, supra
n N.
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accountability, but are intended, instead, to better inform the
design of a model by which that need could be achieved. Find-
ing such a model has to be done because the recovery of the rule
of law is an ethical and political necessity and an essential com-
ponent of justice and peace.
